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NOTES
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SO-CALLED
DOCTRINE OF MUTUAL REMEDY AND ITS
APPLICATION IN KENTUCKY
Probably no other doctrine in the field of equity has caused
so much confusion as the doctrine that in order for one person
to be given specific performance the remedy must be available
to the other party. The term "mutuality of remedy" (or rather
"lack of mutual remedy") by which the doctrine was denomi-
nated, has a rather suggestive meaning (perhaps I should say
meanings), and yet a very indefinite signification. Like a
"Mfother Hubbard", it can be used to cover a multitude of
situations and at the same time explain none of them. It is
not surprising that the bench fell victim to the mirage and
early accepted and attempted to apply the doctrine without
a thorough investigation as to the possibilities and pitfalls con-
tained in it.
Before examining the Kentucky cases, it may be appro-
priate to examine very briefly the historical background of the
doctrine. It has been intimated that the doctrine had its origin
in the case of Flight v. B olland.1 In that case, A, an infant,
entered into a contract with B. B refused to perform. A
brought an action for specific performance of the contract.
The plaintiff, being an infant, was not amenable to an order of a
court of chancery. Had the defendant been the plaintiff he
could not have had specific performance. The court dismissed
the plaintiff's bill, saying, "It is not doubtful that it is a general
principle of courts of equity to interpose only where the remedy
mutual." However, it is probable that prior to Flight v. Boll-
and the view expressed by that case had been anticipated by
the practitioners in chancery. There seemed to be the notion
(which has by no means been entirely dispelled even today),
that mutuality of remedy was an important requisite in equity.
It was but natural that the courts should confuse "mutuality of
obligation" with what they called "mutuality of remedy". Of
14 Russell 298 (1828).
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course, where there is an absence of mutuality of obligation
the agreement does not rise to the dignity of a contract. The
doctrine of mutual remedy has no proper application except to
a contract. But, the courts failed to observe this distinction
and the notion grew that there was a special defense of lack
of mutuality in the obligation applicable to the defendant in
equity which might not be applicable to the same defendant
when sued at law.2
Many judges and text-book writers have referred to cases
decided long before Flight v. Bolland as supporting the assertion
that there must be mutuality in the remedy. However, I believe
that the examination by Professor Wim. Draper Lewis in his
scholarly article3 shows that these cases in fact were decided
on other grounds.
In Fry on Specific Performance of Contracts4 we find the
statement:
"A contract, to be specifically enforced by the court must be
mutual,-that is to say, such that it might, at the time it was entered
into, have been enforced by either of the parties against the other of
them. Whenever, therefore, whether from personal incapacity, the
nature of the contract, or any other cause, the contract is incapable of
being enforced against one party, that party is equally incapable of
enforcing it against the other, though its execution in the latter way
might in itself be free from the difficulty, attending its execution in
the former."
In a note to the section it is stated, "No rule in equity is
more thoroughly settled than this". A similar rule was stated
in Pomeroy's great work on Equity Jurisprudence, Sections
163, 165.
After the appearance of Lord Fry's treatise and Pomeroy's
work, the courts began to quote verbatim from these two author-
ities.5
With the rule formulated by Lord Fry in mind, the courts,
unfortunately for the rule, conceived a different use for the idea
of "mutuality". It was argued that if the absence of mutuality
2 Bromley v. Jeffries, 2 Vernon 415 (1700); Clark v. Price, 2 WIl-
son Ch. 157 (1819); Howel v. George, 1 Maddock 13 (1815).
3 49 U. Pa. L. Rev. 270.
'Am. Ed. (1861) c. 8; See. 286, p. 198.
5For example, see: Ochs v. Kramer, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 762, 107 S. W.
260 (1908), (Fry, Sec. 440); Luse v. Deity, 46 Iowa 205 (1877), (Fry,
Sec. 286); Richmond v. The Dubuque & Sioux City R. R. Co., 33 Iowa
443 (1871); Bumgardner v. Leavitt, 35 W. Va. 194, 13 S. E. 67 (1891),
(Pomeroy, See. 165).
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of remedy was a good reason for denying relief, a fortiori, if the
defendant could have obtained relief, the plaintiff should have
relief even though otherwise he would not be entitled to it. A
number of cases decreed specific performance in favor of a
vendor of land (whose remedy in damages was generally
regarded as inadequate, and by the Restatement of Contracts is
conclusively presumed to be inadequate), on the ground that
since the vendee could secure specific performance if he sued
for it, the vendor will be given specific performance.6
As a result of this development, we thereupon had the
two following propositions of law:
(1) The plaintiff, even though otherwise entitled to it,
will be denied specific enforcement if the defendant
could not have obtained it.
(2) The plaintiff, even though otherwise not entitled to it,
will be granted specific enforcement if the defendant
could have obtained it.
For some unknown reason, the courts failed to observe
that the two propositions, as stated, were inconsistent and incapa-
ble of application. As can be readily seen, each rule was appli-
cable to every case.
A number of writers did see the apparent inconsistency and
attempted to explain it away. However, they proposed drastic
modifications of one or both rules, which modifications were
never adopted by the courts.
It is patent that the courts found it necessary to engraft
exceptions upon the rule that there must be mutuality of
remedy at the time of the formation of the contract. Eight
propositions were stated by Dean Ames where the doctrine did
not apply.7 As might be expected, the exceptions literally "ate
up the rule", although the courts continued to talk about the
necessity for mutuality of remedy.
Strong judges openly began to criticize the rule as generally
stated and others to deny it altogether. For example, in the
Raymond v. San Gabriel Val. L. & W. Co., 1893 C. C. A., 53 Fed.
883 (1893); Dollar v. Knight, 145 Ark. 522, 224 S. W. 983 (1920);
Pearson v. Gardner, 202 Mich. 360, 168 N. W. 484 (1918); Springs v.
Sanders, 62 N. C. 67 (1866); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Berry, 153 S. C.
496, 151 S. E. 63 (1930); McCaskill Co. v. Dekle, 88 Fla. 285, 102 So.
252 (1924); Jackens v. Nicolson, 70 Ga. 198 (1883).
73 Col. L. Rev. 1.
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much discussed and well-reasoned case of Epstein v. Gluckin8
we find the now classic statement of Judge Cardozo-"If there
ever was a rule that mutuality of remedy existing not merely
at the time of the decree, but at the time of the formation of
the contract, is a condition of equitable relief, it has been so
qualified by exceptions that, viewed as a precept of general
validity, it has ceased to be a rule today." And see the state-
ment in Javiere v. Central Altagracia9 by Holmes, J., "There
is too a want of mutuality in the remedy, whatever that objection
may amount to." 10
Dean Ames in his scholarly article" stated the true princi-
ple to be that "Equity will not compel specific performance
by a defendant, if after performance, the common law remedy
of damages would be his sole security for the performance of
the plaintiff's side of the contract." The American Law
Institute's Restatement of the Law of Contracts, by means of
Sections 373, 374, and 37512 incorporates the principle stated
8233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861 (1922).
p217 U. S. 502, 508, 54 Law Ed. 859, 30 Supt. Ct. 598 (1910).
10 See further Williston on Contracts, Vol. III, Sec. 1433.
113 Col. L. Rev. 1, 2, 3. And see Judge Cardozo's statement in
Epstein v. Gluckin (supra n. 8), "What equity exacts today as a condi-
tion of relief is the assurance that the decree, if rendered, will operate
without injustice or oppression either to plaintiff or to defendant."
12 Sec. 373. "Specific enforcement may properly be refused if a
substantial part of the agreed exchange for the performance to be com-
pelled is as yet unperformed and its concurrent or future performance
is not well secured to the satisfaction of the court."
Sec. 374. (1) "Except as stated in Subsection (2), specific en-
forcement will be refused if a condition precedent to the duty to be
enforced has not been and cannot be performed and is not excused, or
if a condition subsequent terminating the duty has occurred."
(2) "Specific enforcement will not be refused by reason of pro-
visions in the contract which make the duty of performance depend
upon conditions, precedent or subsequent, of such a nature that refusal
of a decree will effectuate an unjust penalty or forfeiture, and If sub-
stantial performance of the agreed exchange is assured as required by
the rule stated in Section 373."
Sec. 375. (1) "Specific enforcement will not be decreed if the
plaintiff has himself committed a material breach and its refusal will
not effectuate an unjust penalty or forfeiture."(2) "Specific enforcement may properly be decreed in spite of a
minor breach or innocent misrepresentation by the plaintiff, involving
no substantial failure of the exchange for the performance to be com-
pelled."
(3) "If specific enforcement is decreed in spite of a breach by
the plaintiff, the defendant has a right to compensation for such breach.
This may be given either by making a just abatement in the price or
other performance to be rendered by the defendant, or by making the
decree conditional on payment to the defendant of reasonable compen-
sation in money."
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by Ames and secures the purposes which were instrumental in
the formation of the old rules regarding mutuality of remedy.
And Section 37213 repudiates the two inconsistent rules that
sprang up, and a restatement of the rules is made that corre-
sponds with the rules laid down by the overwhelming majority
of cases.
However, it was not my sole purpose at the beginning of
this paper to investigate the sources of the rules governing
mutuality of remedy, but to discuss briefly the main Kentucky
decisions and compare their holdings with the Rules stated
in Section 372 of the Restatement of the Law Contracts.
There axe three leading cases in Kentucky that state a
general rule contrary to Section 372 but avoid the consequences
of the rule on other grounds.14
The first case, Burton v. Shotwell, emphatically states the
rule formulated by Lord Fry and in the opinion the court cites
Fry on Specifti Performance, Section 286. But the rule had no
application in the case as it was found that the inability of
the defendant to enforce the contract against the plaintiff
arose from his own conduct. However, at the time of the
formation of the contract, it could not have been enforced by
either party, as the defendant was to transfer certain shares
of stock in a company to be organized in the future.
The case of Burton v. Shotwell was followed by Moayon v.
Moayon. In that case, a husband and wife were living apart
because of grounds of divorce the wife had. The wife was
preparing to petition for a divorce. The husband agreed that
he would convey one third of his estate in trust for their
children if she would drop the suit and resume her relation as
wife. The wife assented and before conveyance the parties
resumed living together. The husband refused to convey the
property and the wife sued for specific enforcement of the
(1) "The fact that the remedy of specific enforcement is not
available to one party is not a sufficient reason for refusing it to the
other party."(2) "The fact that the remedy of specific enforcement is available
to one party to a contract is not in itself a sufficient reason for making
it available to the other; but it is of weight when it accompanies other
reasons, and it may be decisive when the adequacy of damages is dif-
ficult to determine and there is no other reason for refusing specific
enforcement."
"Burton v. Shotwell, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 271 (1877); Moayon v.
Moayon, 114 Ky. b5, 72 S. W. 33 (1903); Ochs v. Kramer, 32 Ky. L,
Rep. 762, 107 S. W. 260 (1908) (approves Lord Fry's rule).
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contract. The husband contended that there was no mutuality
of remedy under the contract. The court admitted the general
proposition that there must be mutuality of remedy but held
that the contract on the part of the wife was executed and
granted the specific enforcement sought.
In Ocks v. Kramer, the court again stated (in slightly
different language), the rule laid down by Lord Fry, but in that
case the court found that the contract was mutually enforceable
at the time of its formation and the defendant had merely lost
his right to enforce it due to his own conduct. The court cited
Moore v. Fitz Randolph.15
Thus, from those three cases it may be seen that a doctrine
contrary to Section 372 of the Restatement of Contracts has
been announced, though in each case it was held inapplicable
because of the particular circumstances. In all three cases,
the defendant by the decree would run no risk of being compelled
to perform without receiving the agreed exchange. No Ken-
tucky case has ever denied specific enforcement on the ground
of lack of mutuality of remedy. On the contrary, an exami-
nation of the Kentucky cases (which reach a result in accord
with Section 372), discloses that the Kentucky court has so
qualified the doctrine announced in Burton v. Shotwell, Moayon
v. Xoayon, and Ochs v. Kramer (and, hence, Lord Fry's rule),
that the exceptions show that our court in the three cases cited
did not stop to consider the problems which are properly in-
volved in Lord Fry's statement.
The first exception in Kentucky that I wish to indicate
(Ames' seventh proposition), is that "a plaintiff who has per-
formed his part of a contract, although he could not have been
compelled in equity to do so, may enforce specific performance
by the'defendant". Three main cases uphold this proposition.10
The better case of the three, Moayon v. Moayon, has been dis-
cussed supra. The above proposition is now generally accepted. 17
156 Leigh (Va.) 175 (1835). "Both parties must by the agreement
have a right to compel a specific performance."
2GLogan County Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 694, 3
S. W. 122 (1877); Moayon v. Moayon, 114 Ky. 855, 72 S. W. 33 (1903);
Allen v. New Domain Oil & Gas Co., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2169, 73 S. W. 747
(1903).
'5Poultry Producers of S. Cal. v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 208 P. 93
(1922); Le Noir v. McDaniel, 80 Fla. 509, 86 So. 435 (1920); Lamprey
v. St. Paul & C. R. Co., 89 Minn. 187, 94 N. W. 555 (1903); Roche v.
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The second exception that I wish to point out (Ames'
fourth proposition), is that "a vendor, whose inability to make
a perfect title debars him from obtaining a decree against the
vendee, may be forced by the vendee to convey with compen-
sation". Two main eases (both old ones) support this propo-
sition.1 8  Thus, in MeConnell's Heirs v. Dunlap's Devisees, the
devisor of the defendants contracted to convey 500 acres out
of one of two tracts. He did not have 500 acres in either of the
two tracts. Upon suit by the heirs of the vendee, the court held
that if the vendor is able to convey part of the tract only, the
vendee may, at his election, compel a conveyance of that part,
and recover damages for the deficiency, or he may refuse to
take such part, and recover damages for the whole. In Jones v.
Shackleford (a better case), the court laid down the following
proposition: "Although a vendor cannot insist upon the
vendee's accepting a part performance of the contract, yet the
vendee may insist upon a specific execution in part and damages
for the residue, where the vendor is unable to perform in toto."
Later cases indicate a similar view. The Kentucky cases are in
accord with the general view.1 9
The third exception that I wish to point out (Ames, eighth
proposition), is that "One who has contracted to sell land not
owned by him and who, therefore, could not be cast in a decree,
may, by acquiring title before the time fixed for conveyance,
compel the execution of the contract by the vendee." The
leading case in Kentucky is Tapp v. Nock.20  In that case the
vendor Nock, at the time of the formation of the contract with
Tapp, did not have the legal title to the contracted premises
but merely an executory contract with the owner for the pur-
chase of the premises. Two months after the formation of the
contract, Nock acquired title and tendered a deed to the premises
Mahar, 104 Wash. 21, 175 Pac. 314, 181 Pac. 857 (1918); Cokayn v. Hurst,
10 Seldon Soc. 141; Whitney v. Hay, 181 U. S. 71, 21 S. Ct. 537 (1901);
Burgess v. Burgess, 206 Ill. 19, 137 N. E. 403 (1922); Howe v. Watson,
179 Mass. 30, 60 N. E. 415 (1901).
'8McConnell's Heirs v. Dunlap's Devisees, 3 Ky. (Hardin) 44
(1805); Jones v. Shackelford, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 410 (1811).
" Swain v. Burnette, 76 Cal. 299, 18 Pac. 394 (1888); Lancaster v.
Roberts, 144 Ill. 213, 33 N. E. 27 (1893); Davis v. Parker, 96 Mass.
(14 Allen) 94 (1867); Catholic Foreign Mission Soc. of America v.
Oussan, 215 N. Y. 1, 109 N. E. 80 (1915); Burrow v. Scammell, 19 Ch.
D. 175 (1881).
'89 Ky. 414, 12 S. W. 713 (1889).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNA
which Tapp refused. Nock was granted specific performance.
This case is in line with the weight of authority.21
The fourth exception that I wish to point out is that
"although the vendor's title is defective at the date of the
formation of the contract, if he perfects his title by the date
for performance, hemay force the vendee to perform." Several
Kentucky cases have announced this proposition. 22 These cases
are in accord with the weight of authority.2 3
The fifth exception may properly be stated as follows:
"A contract by a married woman to sell her land, even though
it cannot be enforced against her, will be enforced against the
vendee if the husband of the vendor is willing to join in the
conveyance at the time enforcement of the contract is sought".
The leading case is Hoffman v. Colgan.24 In that case, Mrs.
Hoff-man agreed to sell her property to Colgan. The husband of
Mrs. Hoffman never signed the contract, but joined in a deed to
the premises. Upon Colgan's refusal to complete the contract,
Mrs. Hoffman and her husband sought specific enforcement.
To the objection by the vendee that the contract was not mutual,
since not binding on Mrs. Hoffman, the court answered that the
objection could not be raised where the party originally not
bound to perform had performed. As can be seen, the court
treated the case as being one where there was no binding contract
at all, but the tender of the deed by the vendor and her husband
constituted an acceptance of the vendee's offer to purchase. By
Section 2128 of Kentucky Statutes 25 a contract by a married
woman to sell her realty, in which the husband is not a party,
is treated as void.2 6 I presume, therefore, by considering Hoff-
man v. Colgan and the later case of Bron v. Allen together,
2 Heller v. McGuin, 261 Ill. 588, 104 N. E. 158 (1914); Melton v.
Stuart, 213 Ala. 574, 105 So. 659 (1925); Bianchi v. Herman, 105 N. J.
Eq. 226, 147 Atl. 505 (1929); Wylson v. Dunn, 34 Ch. D. 569 (1887).
'4Logan v. Bull, 78 Ky. 607, 617 (1880) (quoting Fry's rule);
Smith v. Cansler, 83 Ky. 367, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 317 (1885); Tyree v.
Williams, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 365, 367 (1914) (dictum).
2 Dresel v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407 (1870); Bianchl v. Herman, 105
N. J. Eq. 226, 147 Atl. 505 (1929); Binchney v. Morton, 30 F. (2d) 885
(C. C. A.) (1929); Perry v. Ritze, 110 Neb. 386, 193 N. W. 758 (1923).
21425 Ky. L. Rep. 98, 74 S. W. 724 (1903).
2 Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1930) Sec. 2128. " . . . She may make con-
tracts and sue and be sued ..... , except that she may not make any
executory contract to sell or convey or mortgage her real estate, unless
her husband join in such contract.... ".
26Brown v. Allen, 204 Ky. 76, 263 S. W. 717 (1924). There are
other Kentucky cases in accord.
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that if the vendee should withdraw his offer before the husband
and wife joined in a deed and offered it to him, or the husband
otherwise in writing assented to the contract, then the vendor
would have no right of action whatever.
But the writer is doubtful of the theory that there is no
binding contract at all, but the tender of the deed by the vendor
and her husband constitutes an acceptance of the vendee's
continuing offer to purchase in view of the Kentucky decisions,
arising under the Statute of Frauds,2 7 where it is said that when
a memorandum must be signed by the "party to be charged"
(I refer to contracts concerning the sale or transfer of an
interest in land) this means the vendor, and where the vendor
does not sign, neither party is bound, regardless of who brings
the action.28 Perhaps it is explainable on the ground that Ken-
tucky practically stands alone in its interpretation of this part
of the Statute of Frauds.29 However, it may be true that the
fifth proposition is stated in terms that are too broad. But
the result reached in Hoffman v. Colgan, despite the narrow
ground stated by the court, upholds the proposition as stated.
The result reached by Hoffman v. Colgan has been adopted by
other cases.30
The sixth exception that I wish to point out, perhaps,
cannot be said to be an actual exception to Lord Fry's rule. The
proposition is that "where the defendant by delay or other con-
duct on his part subsequent to the contract has lost his right of
equitable relief against the plaintiff, he cannot complain of
being compelled to perform specifically." In OcIs v. Krameni 1 ,
K sold 0 a parcel of land, one hundred dollars being paid at the
time of the execution of the contract and the remainder to be
paid in a month when the deed was to be made, and if not paid
the down payment was to be forfeited as liquidated damages
and the contract void at the vendor's election. 0 refused to
"Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1930), See. 470.21Murray v. Pate, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 335 (1838) (similar to Hoffman
V. Colgan, but involving the statute of frauds); City of Murray v.
Crawford, 138 Ky. 25, 127 S. W. 494 (1910); Evans v. Stratton, 142 Ky.
615, 134 S. W. 1154 (1911); Wren v. Cooksey, 147 Ky. 825, 145 S. W.
116 (1912); Smith v. Ballou, 211 Ky. 281, 277 S. W. 286 (1925).
28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 680, 684, 690, 691, 695, 700, 701, and the Ken-
tucky cases there cited.
' Bianchi v. Herman, 105 N. 3. Eq. 226, 147 Atl. 505 (1929) ; Dresel
v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407 (1870).
32 Ky. L. Rep. 762, 107 S. W. 260 (1908).
L. J.-5
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perform and K brought suit for specific enforcement. 0 con-
tended that since K could forfeit the down payment and declare
the contract voided, at his election, the contract was wanting in
mutuality of remedy. In overruling O's contention and exposing
the fallaciousness of his argument, the court quoted verbatim
from Fry on Specific Performance, Section 440 and Moore v.
Fitz Randolph.32
As a seventh exception, which like the sixth proposition is
perhaps not truly an exception, it is well settled that "an option
holder may get a decree for specific performance if he exercises
his power in accordance with the terms of the contract and
performs all conditions precedent.'' 3 However, originally in
Kentucky where a lessee under a lease had the option of
purchasing the land, the option could not be enforced by the
lessee.3 4 The court treated that portion of the contract as not
being mutually binding on both parties so far as speci-Ab
execution was concerned. The rule was not changed until 1888
in Bank of Louisville v. Baunmeister.35
In connection with option contracts, care should be exercised
not to confuse the rule stated above with the peculiar doctrine
prevailing in Kentucky as to mineral options. Since Litz v.
Goosling,30 it is clear that a stated consideration of one dollar
is not sufficient to sustain these agreements." The doctrine is
not extended to other options. 38 The doctrine has recently been
severely criticized by the Kentucky court.39
However, with the possible exception as to the mineral
option cases, Kentucky is in accord with the great weight of
authority as to the rights of an option holder to secure specific
enforcement.40
"2Supra, n. 15.
"Bacon v. Ky. Central Ry. Co., 95 Ky. 373, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 77, 25
S. W. 747 (1894); Walton's Exr. v. Franks, 191 Ky. 32, 228 S. W. 1025
(1921); Garvin v. Steen, 243 Ky. 256, 47 S. W. (2d) 1010 (1932).
3Boucher v. Van Buskirk, 9 Ky. (2 A. K. Marsh) 349 (1820).
"87 Ky. 6, 7 S. W. 170 (1888).
-93 Ky. 185, 19 S. W. 527 (1892).
"IThompson & Co. v. Reid, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 176, 101 S. W. 964
(1907); Noble v. Mann, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 30, 105 S. W. 152 (1907);
Berry v. Frisbie, 120 Ky. 337, 86 S. W. 558 (1905); Stamper v. Combs,
164 Ky. 733, 176 S. W. 178 (1915).
8Sparks v. Ritter, 204 Ky. 623, 265 S. W. 26 (1924).
0Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Weideman, 211 Ky. 361, 277 S. W. 323
(1925).
40 Frank v. Schnueltzen, 187- Fed. 515 (C. C. A.) (1911); O'Connell
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As the eighth exception, it is well settled that "an assignee
of a purchaser of an interest in land will be given specific
enforcement of the contract against the vendor". 4 . However, in
the cases that have arisen in Kentucky, it is probable that the
assignee assumed the obligation to perform the assigned con-
tract. The general rule is that the assignee of a contract right
can get specific performance on the same terms and conditions
as could the assignor, even though the obligor would not have
had a like remedy against the assignee.42
As a final exception, co-operative marketing associations have
been given a decree for specific performance, though the supposed
requisites of mutuality of remedy do not exist. 43 The objection
was in fact raised in Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers Co-
operative Association. The association had no capital stock,
was not operated for profit and was not permitted to buy, handle
or sell tobacco except for its members. However, the court
treated the contract as mutually binding as to obligations but
ignored the problem of mutuality of remedy. The Kentucky
cases are in accord with the overwhelming weight of authority.
The cases are too numerous to cite.
There are a number of cases in Kentucky that discuss the
absence of mutuality of remedy that properly involve the
absence of mutuality of obligation and hence deal with agree-
ments that do not arise to the dignity of contracts.
I wish to point out that the fifth proposition stated by Dean
v. Lampe, 206 Cal. 282, 274 Pac. 336 (1929); Anderson v. Bills, 335 Ill.
624, 167 N. E. 498 (1929); Boston & W. St. R. Co. v. Rose, 194 Massr
142, 80 N. E. 498 (1907); Rockland-Rockport Lime Co. v. Leary, 203
N. Y. 469, 97 N. E. 43 (1911); Dallas v. Gates, 133 Ore. 300, 289 Pac. 497
(1930).
,"Respass v. McClanaham, 9 Ky. (2 A. K. Marsh.) 577 (1820);
Hancock v. Hancock, 17 Ky. (1 T. B. ion.) 121 (1824); Benjamin v.
Dinwiddie, 226 Ky. 106, 10 S. W. (2d) 620 (1928) (dictum).
"Lenman v. Jones, 222 U. S. 51, 32 S. Ct. 18 (1911); Perry v.
Paschal, 103 Ga. 134, 29 S. E. 703 (1897); Welch v. McIntosh, 89 Kan.
47, 130 Pac. 641 (1913); First Nat. Bank v. Corp. See. Co., 128 Minn.
341, 150 N. W. 1084 (1915); Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 135
N. E. 861 (1922).
Contra: Lunt v. Lorscheider, 285 Ill. 589, 121 N. E. 237 (1913);
Horwitz v. Kreuzer, 140 Md. 414, 117 A. 563 (1922).
Owen County Burley Tob. Soc. v. Brumback, 128 Ky. 137, 32 Ky.
L. Rep. 916, 107 S. W. 710 (1908); Grant County Board of Control v.
Allpin, 152 Ky. 280, 153 S. W. 417 (1913) ; Potter v. Dark Tob. Growers
Co-Operative Association, 201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33 (1923) (based on
statute).
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Ames in his article,4 4 certainly is not the law in Kentucky as
to contracts concerning the sale of an interest in land. It seems
that only the vendor need sign in order to bind both parties.45
The signature of the vendee alone is insufficient, even though
he is the defendant in the action.46 The court refuses to adopt a
theory of continuing offer in these cases, as was adopted in Hoff-
man v. Colgan47 under the Married Woman's Act.48
The Kentucky court never adopted the view that the "plain-
tiff, even though otherwise not entitled to it, will be granted
specific enforcement if the defendant could have obtained it".
It is not so much as mentioned in any Kentucky case. It is
stated by the Kentucky court that although a vendee can get a
decree for specific performance by a vendor whose title is de-
fective, or the land deficient in quantity, with compensation for
the defects, the vendor can not enforce the contract against the
vendee. 49 The Kentucky cases permitting a vendor to sue for
specific enforcement of a contract for the sale of an interest in
land do not mention mutuality of remedy as a basis.50 No doubt
Subsection 2 of Section 372 of the Restatement would be
approved by the Kentucky Court.51
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3 Col. L. Rev. 1. "Notwithstanding the opinions of Lord Redes-
dale and Chancellor Kent to the contrary, a party to a bilateral con-
tract, who has signed a memorandum of it, may be compelled to per-
form it specifically, although he could not maintain a bill against the
other party who had not signed such a memorandum."
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